NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - GDS

INFORMATION

August 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

CLINTON E. GRANGER

SUBJECT:

Military Balance in the Far East

Basic force levels and situation assessments for the Far East are contained in the annexes, as follows:

		ANNEX
	Sino-Soviet	
	Sino-Soviet Area of Confrontation	Α
	Sino-Soviet Air Dispositions (Map)	В
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	Fact Sheet: US, USSR, and PRC Force in Asia (DOD)	D
	Chinese Order of Battle	E
		1969
	Korea	
DIA 100		
DIA and JCS reviews	Korean Military Balance	F
completed	Assessment of Military Balance on Korean Peninsula	G
	Strategic Balance	
		Н
	Force Comparison (Notional) (DOD)	
in the second to the second	<u>Other</u>	
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	Cambodia Order of Battle	J
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	Japan Order of Battle	L
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	Philippines Order of Battle	0
ON-FILE NSC RELEASI	Singapore Order of Battle	P
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	DOD Military Personnel Strength	K

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Soviet and PRC Military Forces SOVIET Soviet Far East1 Total Not Not Operational Operational Operational Strategic 2202/ $0 - 1^{3/2}$ Missiles (200) 1401 ICBM 30-35 (41)87 IRBM 25-35 (12)496 MRBM 5-10 SRBM 784/ Naval В. $(28)\frac{4}{4}$ $(258)\frac{4}{4}$ 5 16 Submarines 60 8004/ 236 Launchers Air (84)195 Long-Range A/C 74 (136)650 Medium-Range A/C 155/ Backfire A/C Air Defense (611)2570 PVO Interceptors

Includes four military districts and Mongolia.

Includes launchers at reduced readiness, under construction, or being modified.

3,200 nm range missile cannot reach continental US.

Includes units on sea-trials or undergoing repair.


Includes "Ome six Backfires subordinate to the Long Range Air Training Division.

		507	VIET	PRC
		<u>Total</u>	Far East1/	
ıı.	Conventional			
	A. Ground Forces			
	Combat units Tank Div. Motorized Rifle Div.	49 111	(4) (38)	10 122
	Airborne Artillery			3 22 15
	AAA Combat Equipment			
	Tanks & assault guns APCs Artillery	48,500 25,000	(12,850) (8,000)	6,000 1,200 14,000 6,500
	AA guns		-	6,500
	B. Naval	219	(58)	20
	Major surface ships Minor surface ships Amphibious Attack subs	1,023 83 253	(238) (20) (80)	940 520 72
	Aircraft Strike/Recce ASW	595 150 265	(170) (55) (80)	
	Helicopters Transports	115	(20)	
	C. Air Air Defense	1,953 1,842	(360) (578)	4,020 890
	Ground Attack Reconnaissance Transport (planes & helos) Trainers	812 3,500	(231)	60 970 850

1/Includes four military districts and Mongolia.

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Soviet and		
	USSR	
Ground Forces	1,810,000*	3,510,000*
Air Forces	496,000	431,800
Naval Forces	372,000	278,000
Strategic Rocket Troops	397,000	90,000-150,000
Air Defense Forces	559,000	
MOD Command & Support	786,000	
TOTAL	4,420,000	4,309,800-4,369,800
Non-MOD Security Forces	335,000	
GRAND TOTAL	4,755,000	

*Five days after mobilization the USSR would have approximately 3,000,000 men mobilized in the ground forces. could have approximately 6,000,000 within 15 to 30 days.

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Sino-Soviet Assessment

The military situation along the Sino-Soviet border continues to be relatively stable. Some sources report occasional clashes between Soviet and Chinese forces along the border and earlier this year the Soviets complained of Chinese provocations. We have, however, no direct evidence of unusual Chinese activity along the border.

The Soviet buildup of forces on the border seems to have peaked in the late 1960s and the major part of the Chinese response to that buildup was completed by late 1970. Since then, both nations have slowly added to forces in the border regions, but at present neither side could launch or maintain a major offensive without reinforcements. As one example of this gradual upgrading, the Soviets are now delivering the advanced Fencer light bomber to tactical air units in the Far East Military District.

Soviet forces on the ground are postured generally for both offensive and defensive operations. Chinese forces are better suited for the defense. Not surprisingly, the Chinese have the advantage in manpower, the Soviets in critical categories of weapons.

Measuring the Sino-Soviet balance in terms of real combat potential is not easy. By any standard measure the Soviets enjoy clear superiority. But standard measures are hard to apply to the Sino-Soviet balance. First of all, despite its very small size and very slow growth, the Chinese nuclear force probably presents a form of minimum deterrence against Soviet attack because it would be hard to destroy with confidence in a lightning attack . . . this, at least, is the way the Soviets appear to see it and that is what counts. Second, while the Soviets enjoy military superiority in land combat forces, it is hard to see them defeating China in the common sense of the word except at very great cost over a long period of time. We know little about the strategies that either side would apply in an actual conflict. And much would depend on how it came about. But judging from military capabilities and expressed doctrine on each side we conclude that in the event of conflict: ..

- -- The Chinese would attempt to hold Soviet ground forces with their own forward conventional forces, backed by a form of widespread unconventional or people's war. They might refrain from using any surviving nuclear weapons against Soviet civilian targets in the hopes of restraining Soviet use of nuclear weapons.
- -- The Soviets would attempt to prevent local Chinese incursions into their territory, to defeat Chinese main force units with operations as shallow into China as possible, and to bombard China out of the war from the air, probably with nuclear weapons.

If the Soviets conceived of their conflict objective as driving the Chinese out of the war but not defeating and occupying all of China, we believe the Soviets would win such a war. But they in no way relish the prospect. While there is ample possibility for explosive crisis on the Sino-Soviet frontier, perhaps growing out of post-Mao political struggles, we do not see either side as having a near-term incentive to provoke a major conflict.

The main Soviet military objective on the Sino-Soviet border, in our view, is to maintain a posture suitable for what we might call "active containment." That is, it would be fully adequate to deter and, if necessary, to defeat provocative Chinese military actions on the border, but also sufficiently superior and offensive in character to exert a constant influence over Chinese foreign policy and also, to an extent, in Chinese internal affairs. The Soviets do not expect much in the way of improvement in their relations with China. But they continue to hope that some improvement could be obtained under a new leadership. Their military forces are designed both to guard against the prospect of continued Sino-Soviet hostility but also to help persuade new Chinese leaders that it would be better for them to seek improved relations with Moscow.

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FACT SHEET

Subject: US, USSR, and PRC Forces in Asia (U)

- 1. (U) The attached spread sheet provides a summary of current US, USSR, and PRC combatant forces in Asia (Notional).
- 2. (S) The following significant trends in force deployments in Asia have occurred since the beginning of 1972:

a. US

- Conducted a major force withdrawal from Southeast Asia.
 - -- Strategic air (B-52s) reduced from a high of 205 aircraft to 14 aircraft.
 - -- WESTPAC carrier deployments reduced from six to three.
 - -- Tactical air (including AC, 130 gunships) reduced from high of nearly 500 land-based aircraft to 128.
 - -- All ground forces withdrawn from SE Asia.
- Increased US Naval presence in the Indian Ocean, with one deployment per quarter (average).
 - -- Moved forward on buildup of Diego Garcia to support Indian Ocean deployments.

b. USSR

- Maintained relatively stable force levels.
 - -- Air capabilities increased through modernization and qualitative improvements.
 - --- 10% increase in number of ASW aircraft.
 - --- Improved air-surface missile capabilities.
 - -- Soviet SSBN deployments have increased.

Classified by Director, J-5
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DISCLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE OTHER 11652
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- -- Out-of-area deployments of major surface combatants to the Indian Ocean continues.
- -- Ground forces continue to show qualitative improvement.
- -- ICBMs, improvements through MRV/MIRVing, silo hardening, and increased accuracy.

C. PRC

- Ground forces estimated to number over 3.5 million.
 - -- Nearly one half (1.6 million) stationed in four MRs bordering the USSR and Mongolia.
 - -- Rate of total strength increase is leveling off.
 - -- Qualitative improvements in equipment, organization and training have been occurring and are expected to continue.
- Navy remains equipped and trained to carry out its highly specialized role as a coastal defense force.
 - -- A nuclear powered submarine building program is under way but has experienced difficulties.
- The deployment of the CSSX-3 (limited range-ICBM) is limited, one silo is completed, one is nearing completion, a third is a possibility.

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Prepared by: Col S. E. Daniel, USA Northeast Asia Br, J-5 Extension 72400

A. GROUND Personnel Strength Army (Current/M+30) 325,000/350,000 Combat Units Infantry Divisions 18/20 Armored Infantry Brigades 1 Armor Brigades 3 Airborne Brigades 2 Combat Equipment Tanks, Medium 160 Tanks, Light 940 APCs 250 Assault Guns 215 Artillery 1,500 AA Guns 300 Air Defense Missiles 300 В. NAVAL Personnel Strength (Current/+30) 68,000/90,000 35,000/42,000 Marines 33,000/48,000 Destroyers & Destroyer 21 Escorts Submarines .2 Patrol 22 Other. 122 C. AIR FORCE Personnel Strength 72,000 Aircraft (Total/Operational) 598/460* Fighters 305 F-104 64 F-100 91 F-5 58 F-86 (used as trainers) 51 T-33 & T-38 41

*Does not include 144 aircraft of the Army and Navy

25X1

25X1

c.	AIR FORCE (continued)		25 X 1
13 4	Transports	103	· · · · · · · · · .
	Helicopters Utility	13 39	



KOREAN MILITARY BALANCE

CO	mparison of Forces	· [<u>· ·</u>	25X1
				20,0
A.	GROUND			
	Personnel Strength			1 3
	Army	408,000	527,000	
	Reserves	1.3 million		
	Combat Units	 	and the last of the first of the last last last at the last last last last last last last last	
	Infantry and Mechanized			
	Infantry Divisions	23	18	
	Armored Divisions	and the second s	0	
	Infantry Brigades	2 2	, 0	
	Armored Brigades	ō		
	Armored Regiments	7	0	
(Airborne Brigades	Ó	3	
	Airborne Battalions	5	0	
•	Marine Corps Divisions	Ö	1	
	Combat Equipment	₩	-	
	Tanks	1,500-1,700	800	
	Assault guns	60-100	000	
	Artillery pieces	2,650	2,160	er i Maria Granda de Carlos de C
			2,100	
В.	NAVAL		<u>*</u>	
•	Personnel Strength	25,000	41,900	
	Ship Types			
•	Destroyer and Destroyer Esco	ort 2	10	
	Submarines	9	0	$\frac{\mathcal{F}_{i}}{\mathcal{F}_{i}} = \frac{\mathcal{F}_{i}}{\mathcal{F}_{i}} = \frac{\mathcal{F}_{i}}{\mathcal{F}_{i}}$
1 +	Guided Missile Patrol Boats	18	Ö	**************************************
	Amphibious-related craft	60	93	
	Other Patrol Boats	270-300	32	
			~~	
C.	AIR			
	Personnel Strength	44,400	28,500	6 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Total Aircraft	920	850	
	Fighters - subsonic	250-300	101	
	Fighters - supersonic	230-240	100	25X1
	Bombers	8.6	0	
	Transports, helicopters,		· ·	
	utility aircraft	295	600	·
•	Surface-to-air missile launch	hers		
. :	Anti-aircraft artillery piece	es		
		TT .		1.

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Assessment of Military Balance on Korean Peninsula*

The factors that have restrained from launching major hostilities continue to do so. These are the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, the presence of US troops, the lack of an across the board superiority over ROK forces, especially if they are supported by US tactical air and naval elements, and the need for support from either Moscow or Peking in a sustained, large-scale conflict.

On the ground, the South has the numerical advantage while the North has the edge in combat units, firepower, and armor. Each is capable of penetrating the frontline defenses of the other, but neither is capable of over-running and holding targets deep within the territory of the other.

is clearly superior to that of the South in terms of ships in active service, readiness, and firepower. because of its missile boats and submarines, can effectively neutralize any purely South Korean naval threat.

The air forces of both Koreas are well trained and in a high state of readiness. have the numerical edge in aircraft and perhaps the better air defense system. The South Koreans have the qualitative advantage in aircraft and have more proficient pilots. At this time neither side appears able to neutralize the other's air force nor gain air superiority over the other's territory.

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^{*} Assessment based on North vs. South only.

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FORCE COMPARISON (NOTIONAL)

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<u> Air</u>			1. - 1
Bombers Naval Air Fighter	14 520 360	120 170 1700	75 650 4800
Naval			
Carriers Submarines (Ballistic Mx) (Attack) Major Combatants	8 9 35 76	0 27 80 56	0 0 <u>1</u> / 66 21
Ground			
Divisions Tanks Artillery	3 250 220	40 7100 3000	267 10500 24800
Strategic Missiles			
ICBM MRBM IRBM	0 0 0	200 - 0 0	30 30 0

1/ Under development

SLBM

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Cambodia

A. GROUND

Personnel Strength

60,000-70,000

Artillery 105 and 155mm

274

B. NAVAL

River Patrol Boats Coastal Patrol Boats 60 17-19

Sub Chaser

C. AIR

T-28s

Approx. 100

NOTE: Accurate current information on the status, composition, and disposition of the Cambodian armed forces is almost totally lacking.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM



25X1

A. GROUND

Personnel Strength Army (Current/M+5) Civil Defense	200,000/200,000 25,000/25,000
Combat Units (Current/M+5) Independent Brigades	17/17
Combat Equipment Tanks, Medium Tanks, Light APC	0 176 565

B. NAVAL

	rsonnel Strength	(Current/M+5)	38,500/38,50
٠.	Ship Type*		0.40
	Destroyer		8/9
	Submarine		3/3
	Patrol/Missile	Equipped 7	8/8
	Patrol		18/38
	Mine Warfare		9/13
	Amphibious War	fare Craft	10/11
	Auxiliaries		18/21

C. AIR

Personnel Strength (Current/M+5) Total Aircraft*	28,000/28,000 178/239
Fighters	42/42
F-51	11/11
T-33	16/16
Avon Sabre	15/15
Transports	59/59
Helicopters	23/23
Trainers	49/49

* The first figure represents number of units operationally assigned; the second number represents total in inventory.

Note:

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MILITARY FORCES

		Japan
Α.	GROUND	
***	Personnel Strength	155,000
	Combat Units	<u>.</u> .
	Armies	5
	Infantry Divisions	13
	Mechanized Divisions	
	Airborne Brigades	
	Artillery Battalions	13
	Tank Brigades	1
	Combat Equipment	273
	Tanks - medium	563 69
	Tanks - light	866
	APCS	1,356
	Artillery Pieces	1,550
В.	NAVAL	37,000
	Personnel Strength	2377000
,	Ship Types	47
	Destroyer and Destroyer Escort	15
	Submarine	290
	Other Naval craft	230
C.	AIR Personnel Strength	42,000
	Total Aircraft	947
	Fighters	
	F-86	253
	F-104	168
	F-4	40
	. RF-86	15
	т-33	167
1	Transports and other aircraft	294

MILITARY FORCES

Laos

A. GROUND

National Army

PL

FAR

33,000

46,000 (Being demobilized

or integrated into

PL forces)

B. NAVAL

Insignificant

Note: Reliable current information on the Lastian military forces is lacking.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

MILITARY FORCES

25**X**1

25X1

A. GROUND

Personnel Strength	
Army (Current/M+5)	51,500/51,500
Special Services	1,200/1,200
Combat Units (Current/M+5)	
Independent Battalions	33/33
Combat Equipment	
Armored Cars	334
Scout Cars	600
APC	140

B. NAVAL

Personnel Strength	(Current/M+5)	4,500/4,500
Ship Type*		
Destroyer		1
Patrol		27/34
Mine Warfare	_	6 -2
Amphibious War	fare Ships	1
Amphibious War	fare Craft	20/24
Auxiliaries		2

C. AIR

Personnel Strength	(Current/M+5) 5	,000/5,000
Total Aircraft*		135/136
Fighters	the control of the second of the control of the	43/43
CL-41G		20/20
Avon-Sabre		15/15
F-5s		8/8
Transports		33/33
Helicopters		39/39
Trainers		14/14

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^{*} The first figure represents number of units operationally assigned; the second number represents total in inventory.

Note:

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MILITARY FORCES

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A. GROUND

Personnel Strength		36,000/36,000
Army (Current/M+5)		223
Home Defense Force		223
Combat Units (Current/M+5)		
Armored Cavalry Troop		<u>.</u> L
Infantry Division		<u>კ</u>
Independent Brigades		Z
Combat Equipment		Λ.
Tanks, Medium		0
Tanks, Light	14	21
APC		35

B. NAVAL

Personnel Strength (Current/M+5)	14,600/14,600
Ship Type*	51/64
Patrol	• •
Mine Warfare	4/6
mile nativate	9/11
Amphibious Warfare Ships	2/26
Amphibious Warfare Carft	
Auxiliaries	9/11

C. AIR

Personnel Total Airo	Strength	(Current/M+5)	15,000/15,000 275/294
Fighters			55/5 5
F-5s			17/17
TD-28s	3		7/7
T-34s			5/5
F-36			21/21
SF-260			4/4 74/74
Transpor			34/34
Helicop Trainers			64/64

* The first figure represents number of units operationally assigned; the second number represents total in inventory.

Note:

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Α.	GROUND

Personnel Strength Army (Current/M+5)	12,00	00/12,000
Combat Units (Current/M+5)		4 / 4
Independent Brigades		4/4
Ranger Battalion		1/1
Combat Equipment		
Tanks, Medium	and the second of the second	_U
Tanks, Light		50
APC		250

B. NAVAL

Personnel Strength (Current/M+5)	1,200/1,200
Ship Type*	6/6
Patrol/Missile Equipped Patrol	5/10
Amphibious Warfare Ships	0/1
Amphibious Warfare Craft	4/4
Auxiliaries	1/1

C. AIR

Personnel Streng	gth (Current/M+5)	T'600\T'600
Total Aircraft*		88/1 06
Fighters	···[[4] [[4] [[4] [[4] [[4] [[4] [[4] [[55/55
		38/38
Hunters		17/17
A-4s		
Transports		6/6
Helicopters		7/7
Trainers		33/33

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^{*} The first figure represents number of units operationally assigned; the second number represents total in inventoru.

Note:

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MILITARY FORCES

25X1

Α.	GROUND	
	Personnel Strength	132,000
	Combat Units Infantry Divisions Regimental Combat Teams Special Forces Groups Airborne Battalion Aircraft (attached to Ground Forces)	5 2 3 1 257
В.	NAVAL	
	Personnel Strength	27,000
	Ships Principal Combatants Medium Patrol/ASW Coastal Patrol Craft River Patrol Craft	7 9 22 28 41
	Other Aircraft (attached to Navy)	29
C.	AIR Personnel Strength	43,000
	Aircraft	37 3

		Vietnam
Α.	GROUND	
	Personnel Strength	380,000-398,000
	Combat Units	27
	Infantry Divisions Independent Infantry Regiments	15
	Training Divisions	2 55
	AAA Regiments SAM Regiments	20 5
	Armor Regiments Artillery Regiments	20
	Engineer Regiments NVA Sapper Battalions	14 33
	NAVAL	
В.		4,000-8,000
	Personnel Strength	4,000 0,000
	Ships Komar class PTG	3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
	PGM PT/PB	30 4
	PCS	2 50
	Service Craft US and SVN	3
c.	AIR	
	Personnel Strength	10,000-12,000
	•Aircraft	4 • •
	MIG 15/17 MIG 19	115 67
	MIG 21 F-5	68 75
	A-37	113
	Transports	139
	Helicopters Soviet	44
	US	- 469



DOD MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH

		rce					
	Army	Air For	Navy Ashore	Navy Afloat	USMC Ashore	USMC Afloat	TOTAL
West Pacific	41,139	35,322	11,989	20,911	25,093	14	134,468
Japan*	5, 823	14,826	6,604	4,588	23,586	11	55,438
Philippines	32	9,955	4,630	4,516	1,459	3	20,595
South Korea	34, 781	7,110	194	372	37	- -	42,494
Taiwan	503	3,431	561	92	11	-	4,598
Other Afloat	en e	¥	ing the second of the second	11,343	=	-	11,343
Other Pacific	45	377	471	732 *	61	3,413	5,099
Australia	7	269	374		8	-	658
Burma	3	2	1	•	6		12
Indonesia	20	38	18	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	18	- -	94
Malaysia	5	3		-	6		14
Singapore	1	8	15	32 6	6	-	35 6
Other Afloat	.		-	-		3,413	3,413

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^{*}Includes Okinawa